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Financial  Implications of the U.S. 
External Deficit 
Of all the potential problems associated with the U.S. 
current account deficit, none has caused more concern 
than its financing. By official  estimates, the net book 
value of U.S.  liabilities to foreign countries, including 
equities, is now about $500 billion and is increasing at 
a rate of over $100 billion annually. This growth has 
spawned  numerous fears  about  foreigners'  capacity 
and willingness to continue lending to this country and 
about the consequences of rising foreign influence on 
U.S.  financial markets. Prominent observers have 
warned of serious economic strains if the rapid accu- 
mulation of external debt continues. These strains 
include growing pressures on domestic interest  rates 
and the dollar, increased financial volatility  with risks of 
financial crisis, and constraints on U.S. macroeconomic 
policies imposed by the need to maintain foreigners' 
willingness to hold our debt. 
All of these concerns reflect the presumption that fur- 
ther rapid accumulation of external debt will make the 
financing of the U.S. current account,  deficit pro- 
gressively more difficult.  Nevertheless, little concrete 
information about the potential severity of these prob- 
lems is available.  Prior analyses have generally 
focused  on projected  aggregate  indicators,  such as 
U.S. debt and debt service relative to GNP or foreign 
wealth, and have relied upon criteria supplied by past 
experience to assess the seriousness of the problem. 
While suggestive, historical comparisons have only lim- 
ited relevance to the financing of the deficit of the 
world's largest economic power in an era of rapid inter- 
nationalization of financial activities. The economic 
implications of continued  U.S. deficits are likely to be 
determined by more specific conditions. These include 
the situation of key groups of foreign investors, their 
capacity and willingness to absorb further  U.S. debt, 
and the magnitude of the changes in interest rates and 
exchange rates that are likely to be required. 
This article  examines the present and future implica- 
tions  of financing  U.S.  external deficits.  Without 
attempting to be  comprehensive, we analyze several 
features of the past funding of the deficit that probably 
will help to determine the impact of future financing. 
We then use this analysis, as well as evidence drawn 
from previous literature, to assess the financial implica- 
tions of future deficit scenarios and their potential 
effects on domestic interest rates and on the dollar's 
value. 
As the first section shows, the financing of the U.S. 
deficit since 1982 has been characterized by the gen- 
eral predominance of private capital inflows, the grow- 
ing importance  after 1985 of official financing,  and 
increasing exposures to U.S. dollar securities by for- 
eign financial institutions, particularly Japanese institu- 
tional  investors.  The analysis suggests that these 
patterns are  likely to change  somewhat  in  coming 
years. In particular, direct investment is likely to pro- 
vide significantly more  net financing for the current 
account deficit in future years than it has since 1985. 
Foreign financial institutions, however,  may be some- 
what less willing  than in the past to rapidly increase 
their holdings of U.S. dollar assets, particularly in rela- 
tion to their overall portfolios. 
The analysis  in the second section draws on past 
financing experience and other evidence to assess the 
possible financial impact of  future  U.S. external deficits. 
By raising foreign investors' exposures to dollar assets 
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accumulation may well lead to upward pressures on 
domestic real interest rates and downward pressures 
on the dollar. Estimates from the literature suggest that 
while the pressures arising from any single year's defi- 
cit are probably modest, the cumulative effects over a 
number of years could be significant, particularly if for- 
eign lenders perceive that large external deficits  are 
likely to persist. 
Applying this analysis to two alternative  financing 
scenarios suggests that a deficit that declined steadily 
to 1 percent of GNP by 1993  would most likely produce 
only a modest further increase in foreign exposures to 
U.S.  assets; any increases in domestic interest rates 
and fall in the dollar needed to finance such a deficit 
path thus are probably relatively small. However,  the 
potential financial strains are likely to be more serious, 
and less predictable,. if the current account deficit 
remains indefinitely at the high levels of recent years. 
In such, a case, private foreigners' exposures to U.S. 
debt and  its attendant  risks are  likely to rise signifi- 
cantly over the next five years. This situation, and the 
prospect of further large debt increases in the future, 
could  cause potentially troublesome financial  strains, 
including a significant rise in domestic long-term real 
interest rates and ongoing downward pressures on the 
dollar. 
Review of financing since 1982 
The more than $600 billion the United States has bor- 
rowed from abroad since 1982 is historically unprece- 
dented  in  magnitude. Indeed, many observers  have 
been surprised by this country's ability to borrow such 
large amounts without encountering major financial dif- 
ficulties.  Understanding how the external deficit has 
been financed, therefore, should help in evaluating the 
prospects  for, and implications of, future financing. 
Accordingly, in this section we present an overview of 
the main patterns of deficit financing over the last six 
years and  then  proceed to focus on two important 
aspects of these patterns. 
Financing overview 
The United States has become a net borrower from 
abroad because the various sectors of the economy 
collectively are spending more than they earn and thus 
have an excess demand for funds in the aggregate. In 
particular, the  federal government's  borrowing demands 
have risen sharply with the increase in the budget defi- 
cit since 1982, while the surplus of the household sec- 
tor has fallen with the decline in the personal savings 
rate. U.S. borrowing from abroad can come through a 
number of channels and a variety of instruments  whose 
relative importance at any time is a joint reflection of 
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the needs and capacities of the individual borrowers 
and lenders. To some extent, funds flow directly from 
foreign savers to U.S. deficit sectors, but more often 
they come through banks and other  financial intermedi- 
aries here and abroad. These funds are supplied not 
only by private entities but also by foreign central 
banks and, occasionally, other government agencies. 
Foreign lending to the United States typically  occurs 
through  three main channels:  banks, securities pur- 
chases by financial and nonfinancial entities, and direct 
investment by foreign corporations in U.S. subsidiaries 
and affiliates.' The ultimate source of the funds bor- 
rowed by the United States is the group of nations with 
current account  surpluses, now primarily Germany, 
Japan, and several of the Asian newly industrializing 
economies. As we  will see, these funds  to a large 
extent have  been  channeled  to the United  States 
through other  countries. 
Table 1 gives the main features of the financing of the 
U.S. current account deficit since 1982 as given in U.S. 
balance of payments  statistics. These figures reveal the 
direct  channels  through  which our deficit has  been 
financed although they do not necessarily identify the 
ultimate sources of the  funds. Recorded U.S. borrowing 
from abroad since 1982 has totaled about $600 billion, 
but actual borrowings have probably been somewhat 
greater since not all capital flows are reported.2 
Several features of this financing are of particular 
interest. First, private capital inflows have supplied the 
bulk of the financing of the deficit but their importance 
has declined  noticeably in recent years. Private 
sources accounted for nearly 80 percent of the total for 
the period as a whole, and virtually all of the funding 
during the first three years, 1983-85.  Since 1985, how- 
ever, the share of private capital inflows in total financ- 
ing  has declined  to  about 70 percent, with  the 
remainder coming from official sources. 
The increased importance of official financing of the 
U.S. deficit after  1985 in large part reflects heavy dollar 
1The U.S. balance of payments  classifications reflect a mix of  these 
channels and instruments.  Capital inflows  are divided into five major 
groups: net borrowing by U.S. resident banks from private entities 
abroad (banking flows), net borrowing by U.S. nonbanks,  net 
securities purchases, direct investment  net inflows,  and changes in 
net  liabilities to  foreign central banks and other official agencies 
(official flows). Direct investment is  defined as the increase in claims 
on an enterprise in which the  foreign investor has a 10 percent or 
greater interest. The net inflows  of course reflect the difference 
between U.S. gross lending and borrowing (gross outflows  and 
inflows).  In 1988, for example.  U.S. banks increased  their  outstanding 
claims on foreigners by  $57.5 billion while their liabilities to abroad 
rose by  $78.9 billion, leaving a net  inflow of $21.4 billion. 
2U.S. statistics report a  cumulative current account deficit for 1983-88 
of nearly $700 billion. $100 billion more than recorded net capital 
inflows.  The difference, known as "errors and omissions" in the 
balance of payments,  is generally thought to consist primarily, 
although  not entirely, of unrecorded  financial flows. purchases by major foreign central  banks in Europe 
and Japan to slow the dollar's depreciation and conse- 
quent appreciation of their own currencies.3  This activ- 
ity was largely concentrated in 1986-87  and was 
actually much more extensive  than indicated  by 
recorded capital  inflows. Indeed, total  foreign central 
bank intervention in 1987 (the year of greatest activity) 
is estimated to have exceeded $100 billion, amounting 
to nearly two-thirds of the total  U.S. current  account 
deficit.4 The bulk of the dollar purchases were placed 
with institutions abroad, however,  and hence were not 
recorded in  U.S. balance of payments data.  To some 
extent, the exchange rate pressure's  that sparked the 
official interventions may reflect a decline in private for- 
eigners' willingness to add further to their U.S. dollar 
assets during this period; probably at least as impor- 
tant,  however,  were altered market perceptions about 
the future course of policies affecting the dollar in the 
wake of the 1985 Plaza agreement. In any case, net 
official dollar purchases appear to have dropped mark- 
edly in 1988 while private financing of the current 
account has rebounded.5 
Equally noteworthy is the composition of the private 
3ln addition, Taiwan's  central bank acquired nearly $50 billion in dollar 
assets in the course of investing its large balance of payments 
surpluses. See Robert McCauley  and Rama Seth, 'Financial 
Consequences  of New Asian Surpluses,' this Quarterly Review, 
Summer 1987. More  recent data can be found in the Financial 
Statistics of Taiwan District, the Republic of China. 
4See Bank for International Settlements.  58th Annual Report,  June 
1988, pp. 187-89. 
5The combined official foreign exchange reserves of Japan, Germany, 
Table  1 
capital  inflows financing the U.S. deficit; these inflows 
are  in  part typical of past experience  and in  part a 
departure from it. As in most years prior to 1982, pri- 
vate foreign funds have been supplied to the United 
States primarily through banks and through net sales 
of securities, in large part to foreign institutional inves- 
tors.6 The contribution of net direct investment inflows 
has been comparatively modest  and highly  variable. 
Indeed net direct investment inflows were virtually.neg- 
ligible  over 1985-87  despite rapid growth in both 
inflows and outflows, but picked up sharply last year. 
We consider the factors  underlying the  direct invest- 
ment patterns and their likely future  development at the 
end of this section. 
The  relative importance of banking and securities net 
inflows has varied considerably  over time, a pattern 
that is consistent with past experience. Bank loans and 
securities issuance represent alternative but substitut- 
able sources of funds to large borrowers. The funds 
Direct Financing of the U.S. Current Account Deficit 
(In Billions of Dollars) 
Total net capital inflows 
Net official inflow,  —0.4 
Net private inflow 
Direct investment 
Securities 
U.S. nonbanking concerns 
U.S. banks nief 
Memo: 
U.S. current account balance  —46.2  —107.1  —115.1  —138.8  —154.0  —135.3 
U.S. net inflows from  foreign banks  —15.7  36.2,  27.7  15.4  27.4  — 
Sources: Survey  of Current Business;  International  Financial Statistics; BIS, International Banking  Developments. 
Note: (+) represents net inflows. 
t1988 figures are preliminary. Dash (—) indicates that data  are  unavailable. 
tnie: not included elsewhere. 
§Change in net claims on the United States of BIS-reporting  banks outside the  United States. 
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Footnote 5 continued 
and the United Kingdom (the three largest interveners)  fell by  over 
$10 billion in the first three quarters of 1988, largely as a result of 
heavy dollar sales by Germany;  substantial dollar  purchases 
resumed in the fourth quarter, however.  Taiwan's  heavy dollar 
purchases have also largely ceased. Recorded official inflows in the 
U.S. balance of payments for  1988 in large  part reflect transfers to 
this country of official accounts placed abroad (in 1987) rather than 
new acquisitions of dollar assets. In effect, U.S. balance of payments 
data understate  the true role of official sources in financing the 
deficit in 1987 and somewhat  overstate that role in 1988. 
6The bulk of  funds coming through U.S. banks represent transactions 
with foreign banks,  in many cases their own subsidiaries.  Banks are 
also large purchasers of foreign securities although, as noted later in 
the  text, they typically hedge their foreign currency exposures. 
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988t 
35.1  80.3  97.3  123.3  135.5  118.9 

























flowing through the two channels are greatly influenced 
by the relative levels of short-term and long-term inter- 
est rates as well as other market factors. For example. 
the sharp rise in securities relative to banking inflows 
in 1986 was partly attributable to the decline in long- 
term relative to short-term dollar interest rates during 
that period; this flattening in the yield curve encour- 
aged borrowers  to shift from shorter term bank funds to 
longer term securities. 
The overall importance of securities inflows in financ- 
ing the U.S. deficit since 1982 represents a significant 
departure from past experience, however. In the 1970s, 
banks typically were the major  conduits for  private 
international capital flows. The large external surpluses 
of the oil-producing nations that arose in the wake of 
the 1974 oil price increase, for example, were placed 
primarily with banks in the United States and Europe 
for  relending to deficit  nations. Although banks have 
continued to play a major role during the 1980s, securi- 
ties flows have become the most important instrument 
for channeling funds from surplus nations in  Europe 
and Asia to finance the U.S. deficit. Over the 1983-88 
period as a whole, cumulative net securities inflows 
into this country exceeded banking inflows by almost 
50 percent and accounted for more than half of total 
net private capital inflows. 
The  predominance of securities in financing the U.S. 
deficit substantially reflects two closely related devel- 
opments.  First,  international securities markets have 
expanded dramatically  both in volume and range of 
participants  over the last several years. Spurred by 
major  financial  liberalizations  undertaken in Europe 
and Japan in the late  1970s and early  1980s,  these 
markets have become an important source of funds for 
major corporations and a key outlet for financial inter- 
mediaries seeking to diversify their portfolios. Second, 
international securities transactions have been stimu- 
lated considerably by the preference of financial institu- 
tions in Japan, the largest surplus nation, for longer 
term assets. This preference is largely attributable to 
the prominence of life insurance and pension funds 
(which typically  have long-term investment horizons) in 
channeling Japanese savings and is  reflected in the 
structure of Japanese capital flows: securities transac- 
tions account for nearly all of net private capital out- 
flows from Japan since 1982. 
The growth  of international securities markets and 
foreign preferences for holding long-term assets also 
help to explain the regional pattern of U.S. deficit 
financing (Table 2). The bulk of the funds provided by 
the major surplus countries, Japan, Germany,  and to a 
lesser extent Taiwan and  Korea, have gone through 
intermediaries in third countries  (primarily in Europe) 
rather than flowing directly to the United States. Only 
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one-quarter of Japan's total capital outflows have come 
directly  to the United States; most of  the remainder has 
been placed in  Europe. In contrast, the United King- 
dom, whose current account was close to balance until 
1988, has been the proximate source of nearly 40 per- 
cent of U.S.  private net capital  inflows over 1983-87 
and virtually all of the banking inflows. These patterns 
reflect a growing tendency for foreign institutions to 
place funds in the international banking and securities 
markets centered  in  London. Borrowers and lenders 
often prefer to use these international markets because 
of their breadth and relative freedom from regulation. 
For example, institutions throughout  the world place 
large amounts of funds in London (in many cases with 
their own affiliates) that are then channeled to entities 
throughout the world.7 Government  and corporate 
securities of the United States and other  countries are 
issued and widely traded in the Eurobond markets and 
purchased by investors from a wide range of countries, 
including, increasingly, Japan. 
Finally, Chart  1  shows the cumulative effect of U.S. 
borrowing on this country's net indebtedness position. 
Based on preliminary estimates, the book value of total 
U.S. indebtedness to other countries at the end of 1988 
was about $485 billion.8 While much concern has been 
expressed about this indebtedness, its significance is 
difficult to assess without further information, including 
the holdings of U.S.  assets in relation to the overall 
portfolios of the key groups of foreign lenders. 
Exposures of foreign financial institutions 
While suggestive,  the aggregate U.S. investment 
position is of only very limited use in judging the finan- 
cial effects  of U.S. borrowing from abroad. More impor- 
tant from this  perspective are the exposures to U.S. 
assets  and their risks  that major  groups of foreign 
investors have incurred in the course of lending to this 
country. These exposures are likely to be key determi- 
nants of the terms that foreign investors will require to 
maintain or increase their claims on the United States, 
and hence of the difficulty of financing future current 
This institutional  feature largely explains why banking inflows  into the 
United States come predominantly  from the United Kingdom. In 
contrast, Japanese banks have been net borrowers of short-term 
funds from both the United States and Europe in recent years. These 
funds have  in large part been used to fund Japanese bank 
purchases of foreign securities. 
•The true market  value of U.S. indebtedness  is a matter of 
controversy.  U.S. net direct  investment  claims are probably 
understated by  the  official data  because the book value of  foreign 
direct investments  in the United States  tends to be closer to market 
value than is the case for U.S. direct investments  abroad. Other 
factors, however, may lead to the  underestimating  of  U.S. liabilities. In 
particular, the discrepancy between the reported U.S. current 
account deficit and net capital inflows  (errors or omissions)  is widely 
thought to include significant amounts of unrecorded U.S. borrowing 
from abroad. account deficits. In this respect, the positions of  foreign 
financial institutions are of particular interest, because 
these institutions have been the primary source of pri- 
vate financing of the U.S. current account. As we have 
seen, foreign banks have accounted for nearly one-fifth 
of U.S. net private  capital  inflows since 1982; along 
with banks, nonbank financial institutions such as life 
insurance companies and pension funds are the major 
foreign private purchasers of U.S. securities. 
In financing our deficit, foreign financial institutions 
are potentially exposed to country and currency risks. 
Country risk refers to the possibility that a nation's bor- 
rowers as a group will be unable to repay foreign credi- 
tors. Although country risk is an important factor  for 
institutions lending to certain developing nations, it is 
unlikely to be a serious constraint on foreign credit to 
the United States for the foreseeable future, since the 
possibilities of aggregate default or serious limits on 
repatriation of foreign funds are  quite small.0 Poten- 
0Note also  that foreign banks as a whole remain net debtors to the 
United States. Admittedly, country risk eventually could become a 
Table  2 
tially  more important as an influence on foreigners' will- 
ingness to lend to the  U.S.  is the currency exposure 
involved in (net) holding of dollar assets and the atten- 
dant risk of losses from unanticipated dollar deprecia- 
tion. Continued large U.S. external deficits will, almost 
inevitably, lead to a rise in private foreigners' aggregate 
net exposure to dollars. To the extent that the deficit is 
not financed  by official dollar  purchases  or direct 
investment inflows, it will usually be financed by dollar- 
denominated liabilities held by private foreigners.1° 
Banks,  however,  generally  do not  bear significant 
amounts of currency exposure. Foreign banks do make 
Footnote 9  continued 
significant factor in U.S. borrowing it large deficits persisted for 
many years. 
IDU.S. borrowers  may issue foreign currency liabilities. In practice, this 
occurs only  to a limited extent, however.  Moreover,  U.S. entities are 
not the  only issuers of dollar  assets. External debt of  developing 
countries, for  example, is largely denominated in dollars. 
Nonetheless,  the U.S. budget and current account deficits are likely 
to be the dominant sources of additions to  the supply of  dollar 
assets in coming years. We discuss this issue further in the next 
section. 
The FinancIng of the  U.S. Current Account DefIcit by Area 
(In Billions of Dollars) 
1985  1986  1987  1988t 
Net capital inflows  from 
1983  1984 
Japan  3.4  17.7  25.4  24.1 
Official  —12.1  —5.2  —18.3  1.7  10.1  — 
Private  15.5  22.8  43.7  22.3  10.8  — 
Direct investment  0.4  4.7  2.2  5.3  3.5  — 
Securities  2.1  7.5  21.6  18.8  14.2  — 
U.S. banks nief  13.0  10.4  19.2  —1.8  —8.5  — 
Continental Europe  7.9  16.4  0.5  7.0  30.2  —7.2 
Official  0.5  —1.1  —0.7  —1.6  — 
Private  7.4  17.6  1.2  8.6  28.4  — 
United Kingdom  17.0  15.9  32.3  44.2  65.1  20.2 
Official  —2.4  —5.9  3.0  —4.1  — 
Private  19.4  21.9  29.3  48.3  67.6  — 
Rest of world  6.8  30.3  39.1  47.9  19.2  64.0 
Official  13.7  6.7  8.1  37.7  45.8  — 
Private  —6.9  23.5  31.0  10.2  —26.6  — 
Japan  20.4  34.8  49.2  85.4  87.0  78.6 
Continental Europe  4.2  13.9  22.5  50.4  46.5  — 
France  —4.4  —0.8  0.0  3.0  —4.1 
Germany  5.0  9.6  16.7  39.7  44.7  48.1 
United Kingdom  5.7  2.7  4.2  0.2  —2.8  —25.4 
Memo: Regional  current account balances 
Sources: Survey  of Current  Business;  various central bank publications. 
Note: (+) represents net  inflows (current account surplus in memo  items). 
tU.S. data for 1988 are annualized averages  of  the first three quarters. Dash (—) indicates that data are unavailable. 
*nie:  not included elsewhere. 
§Includes Belgium, Franca, Germany,  Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,  and certain European  organizations. 
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dollar loans but typically  hedge their exposure with off- 
setting  dollar liabilities.  In contrast,  many large non- 
bank financial  institutions  have substantial  net dollar 
holdings. Thus the present holdings of these institu- 
tions  are likely to be quite important in determining the 
difficulty  with which additional dollar exposure arising 
from future U.S.  deficits will be absorbed. Unfor- 
tunately, .information on the foreign securities holdings 
of nonbank financial institutions (particularly the cur- 
rency composition of  these holdings) is quite limited for 
most countries, although substantial data are available 
for Japan. The Japanese situation is of considerable 
significance, both because Japanese institutional 
investors are among the largest foreign purchasers of 
dollar assets and because their experience is probably 
at least partly indicative of that of nonbanks generally. 
As shown  in Table 3, long-term foreign securities 
holdings of Japanese nonbank  financial institutions 
have grown very rapidly since 1982 and now total more 
than $250 billion. Estimates by Fukao and Okina11  indi- 
cate that dollar-denominated  instruments make up 
slightly  less than three-quarters of  this total, although a 
significant fraction, perhaps as much as one-third, are 
hedged by offsetting  dollar liabilities  (mainly forward 
sales). Life insurance companies and trust accounts  — 
the dominant institutional  invetors  by virtue of their 
role as the primary managers of retirement funds—are 
the largest nonbank holders of foreign securities, 
accounting for one-third and one-quarter respectively 
of the total; the remainder are held primarily by invest- 
ment trusts (similar to mutual funds), savings banks, 
and the government-owned  postal life insurance fund. 
Foreign securities holdings of the major nonbank finan- 
cial groups are now a significant fraction of their total 
assets but are generally well below legal ceilings.12 
Several factors account for the rapid growth of dollar 
and other foreign securities holdings of Japanese insti- 
Charti 
U.S. Net International Investment Position 
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1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988* 
Source:  Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
*Estimates based on 1988 flows added to year-end 
1987 positions. 
11See Mitsuhiro Fukao and Kunlo Okina, "Internationalization  of 
Financial Markets  and Balance of Payments  Imbalances: A Japanese 
Perspective,' Institute for Monetary  and Economic Studies, Bank of 
Japan, Working  Paper, July 1988. Section II of the paper provides a 
highly informative  analysis of the behavior of  Japanese institutional 
investors  and its implications for Japanese  capital flows. Note that 
the Table 3 figures for currency composition and amount  hedged are 
rough averages for all financial institutions. Both vary significantly 
across classes of institutions and over  time as market  conditions 
change. Note also that short-term  and some other foreign currency 
assets are not included in the table data. Fukao and Okina estimate 
that inclusion of such instruments  would raise the foreign security 
share of life  insurance company assets by several percentage points. 
12Ceilings for the major private nonbank  financial institutions are now 
30 percent of  total assets; this is nearly twice the present ratio 
maintained by life insurance  companies, the  largest holders of foreign 
securities. Thus, legal ceilings probably are not presently a binding 
limit on foreign securities holdings. Note also that because of large 
equities holdings valued at  hitorical cost, foreign securities' share of 
the market value of nonbank assets is apt to be considerably lower 
than the book value shares given in the table. tutions. The relaxation in the early 1980s of previously 
stringent government controls on capital flows encour- 
aged nonbanks to diversify into foreign assets.  U.S. 
dollar securities have been especially favored because 
of their high liquidity and attractive yields. They have 
proved particularly desirable to the life insurance com- 
panies  and pension  funds,  which  have very  large 
amounts of funds to invest, a relatively long investment 
horizon, and a strong preference  —  based on regula- 
tory and accounting rules —  for high-interest-bearing 
assets.'3 These considerations suggest that the rapid 
growth  in dollar holdings of nonbanks in  part repre- 
sents a stock adjustment to a desired level that,  for 
regulatory  and other reasons, could not be attained 
earlier. The demand for dollar assets has also been 
stimulated by declining Japanese government borrow- 
ing and falling interest rates, which have reduced the 
supply and attractiveness of domestic long-term invest- 
ment outlets. At the same time, funds available to life 
insurance companies and trust funds have grown com- 
paratively swiftly because  of the rapid increase  in 
retirement savings and the elimination of most tax pref- 
'3lhese  institutions generally must pay dividends out of their interest 
income only, rather than total earnings including capital gains. This 
helps to explain why German mark and Swiss franc instruments  make 
up a negligible proportion of foreign securities holdings; see Fukao 
and Okina, "Internationalization  of Financial  Markets,"  Table 2. 
Table 3 
erences on bank savings accounts. 
Since  1987, foreign securities purchases by Japa- 
nese financial  institutions  have  slowed  noticeably.'4 
While partly a response to large losses incurred as a 
result of dollar depreciation, the slowdown suggests 
that  the stock adjustment process may be coming to an 
end, at least for the major  institutions.  In particular, 
Japanese life insurance companies appear now to be 
almost as diversified  into foreign securities as their 
counterparts in the United Kingdom, and more so than 
their counterparts in most major European countries.'5 
This does not mean  that Japanese  institutions are 
'4Net foreign securities acquisitions by Japanese investors  have 
nonetheless remained quite high because growing purchases by 
nonfinancial corporations have substantially offset declining 
purchases by financial institutions.  Preliminary  data suggest that 
nonfinancial investors  accounted for  at least one-half of Japanese  net 
securities inflows in 1988, compared to about one-third in 1986. 
Unfortunately,  very little information  about the holdings or behavior  of 
nonfinancial  corporations is available. 
1U.K. institutional investors tend to be among the most internationally 
diversified of investors from the major industrial nations. 
Diversification  of  Japanese pension funds also appears to be at least 
as great as in the United States and most of continental Europe, 
although below that in the United Kingdom; again see Fukao  and 
Okina, "Internationalization  of Financial Markets,"  Table 6. Other more 
recent Japanese entrants to the foreign securities markets, including 
public institutions, may continue to undergo stock adjustment for 
some time. 
Foreign  Securities Holdings of Major Private  Japanese Institutions 
(End-Year  Holdings) 
In billions of  dollars# 
Share of total securities holdings 
Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistic Monthly. 
Note: Data generally  include securities with maturities of  one or more years only. 
tlncludes  banking accounts of  trust banks. 
tDash (—) indicates that data are unavailable. 
§Trusl accounts only. 
IlNovember figure. 
#Valued at 128 yen/dollar, approximately  the  average for 1988. 
Institutional  Investors 










Memo: 1988 foreign securities holdings 
Private Bankst  TotaI  Life Insurance  Trust Banks  Investment  Trusts 
2.7  5.7  2.9  0.9  0.2 
7.3  14.1  4.8  3.5  1.6 
10.6  29.4  10.3  7.9  4.1 
11.1  33.6  12.111  8.3  4.8 
0.9  —  7.7  2.0  1.7 
2.0  —  9.3  5.4  8.3 
2.2  —  13.7  7.9  9.2 
2.1  —  14.1  7.2  9.1 
86.7  262.5  94.5  64.8  37.5 
12.5  —  31.0  15.3  14.5 
FRBNY Quarterly Review/Winter-Spring  1989  39 likely to curtail purchases of U.S. dollar securities; sim- 
ply maintaining present asset shares would entail  very 
substantial  acquisitions  in  coming  years.16 However, 
Japanese  nonbanks  now  may  be less willing than 
before to add substantially to their dollar exposures rel- 
ative to total assets and, if so, could demand somewhat 
higher U.S. interest rates to do so. 
More generally, the Japanese record suggests that 
future demand for dollar assets  will be subject to a 
number of important  but potentially conflicting  influ- 
ences. In particular, the forces generated by interna- 
tional financial  integration and  the  domestic financial 
liberalization now  underway  in all major  industrial 
countries could affect the demand for dollar assets sig- 
nificantly. These changes are likely to encourage fur- 
ther diversification into foreign securities, particularly in 
continental Europe where it has so far been relatively 
limited. At the same time, however, as foreign financial 
markets and the range of available  instruments 
broaden, the availability of assets competing with the 
dollar in foreign securities portfolios is apt to increase. 
Partly for this reason, institutions abroad may reduce 
the dollar share of their expanding foreign holdings in 
coming years. Demand for dollar assets will also be 
affected by the availability of attractive investment out- 
lets in foreign countries and by perceptions of the cur- 
rency exposure and other relative risks associated with 
dollar investments. 
Role of direct investment 
The rapid growth  in direct investment inflows  and 
outflows (Chart 2, upper panel) raises questions about 
the reasons for the  trends and their implications for 
future financing from this source. These questions are 
of interest in part  because direct investment net inflows 
may reduce, at least to some extent, the effective dol- 
lar exposure foreigners incur in financing a given U.S. 
external deficit.'7 
Recent trends in direct investment  flows are 
analyzed in detail in Appendix A by David Fernandez. 
That analysis  indicates that the increase in  outflows 
"A rough calculation suggests that Japanese nonbank financial 
institutions could add  $15 billion to  $20 billion per year to net dollar 
holdings without increasing their exposure relative to total assets. 
This assumes  that total assets grow by about 12 percent in yen 
terms (roughly the rate of the last several years) while the dollar 
depreciates by about 3 percent each year. enough to offset the 
projected inflation differential between the two countries. Nonfinancial 
corporations could probably also make substantial further dollar 
purchases without increasing  their exposure. 
170f course, direct  investments  involve some currency exposure. Real 
estate investment,  for example,  may be subject to as much currency 
risk over the medium term as a bond holding. Nevertheless,  for  other 
types of  direct investment,  and over longer horizons,  the currency 
risk is probably a  less significant factor than for  a  fixed nominal 
income instrument. 
over the last several years is in large part an artifact of 
the dollar's depreciation. Much of the growth in out- 
flows reflects imputed capital  gains of U.S. affiliates 
arising from revaluation of assets denominated in for- 
eign currency;  these imputed earnings  automatically 
rise when the dollar falls. In the U.S. balance of pay- 
ments accounts (but not in those of most other coun- 
tries), these are recorded as direct investment income 
in the current account and, to the extent they are unre- 
patriated, as an offsetting direct investment outflow in 
the capital account. Direct investment outflows exclud- 
ing this component are well below the total reported 
figures and show much less growth over the last sev- 
eral years. This pattern  strongly suggests that future 
(reported) U.S. direct investment abroad will be signifi- 
cantly below the levels of recent years—unless  the 
dollar continues to decline rapidly. 
*  Adjusted net Inflows exclude imputed capital gains 
arising from dollar depreciation and selected 
transactions  with Netherlands Antilles.  Figure for 
1988 is authors' estimate. 
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I  Chart  2 
Net Direct Investment and Its Components 
- 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Source:  Department of  Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. In contrast, the sharp increase in direct investment 
inflows appears to arise from  more fundamental and 
potentially lasting economic forces. Virtually all of the 
inflows represent new equity purchases by foreigners. 
A significant portion of direct investment here, partic- 
ularly inflows from U.K. investors, has gone to finance 
foreign participation in  the merger and  acquisition 
boom now underway in the United States. Also impor- 
tant has been the establishment or expansion of pro- 
duction  and  business facilities by foreign-owned 
enterprises, primarily in manufacturing, wholesale and 
retail trade, and finance. In addition, Japanese institu- 
tional  investors have been making substantial invest- 
ments  in U.S.  real estate,  recreation, and  related 
facilities, in part to diversify their large holdings of U.S. 
fixed income assets. 
The strong foreign incentives to invest in the United 
States suggest that direct  investment  inflows may 
remain quite high for  some  time.  To a significant 
degree, however, the recent inflows probably also rep- 
resent a stock adjustment to newly perceived  U.S. 
opportunities that is unlikely to continue indefinitely. 
Japanese investment in U.S. auto facilities, for exam- 
ple, is likely to decline once  production targets are 
achieved. These considerations suggest that although 
direct investment inflows may remain high, they proba- 
bly will not grow as rapidly as in the past several years. 
However,  since outflows are  likely to be much lower 
than  recently  (unless the dollar falls quite substan- 
tially),  a significant  amount of net financing  through 
direct investment can probably be expected in coming 
years. In particular, net inflows excluding  exchange rate 
valuation effects have averaged nearly $20 billion over 
the last three years (Chart 2, lower panel) and proba- 
bly provide a much better indication of future funding 
from this source than the much smaller recorded fig- 
ures would suggest. 
Future financIng  prospects and Implications 
Our review  of the past six years  suggests that the 
financial effects of future U.S. external deficits will be 
determined  by a variety of forces. The impetus to 
financial diversification that has stimulated demand for 
dollar assets over the past six years may continue, 
although not necessarily as strongly. However,  incen- 
tives to diversify into currencies other than the dollar 
could grow, particularly given the significant dollar 
exposures that have already been incurred by some 
major foreign investors. Future demand for U.S. assets 
will also be affected by various domestic and interna- 
tional economic conditions and by developments  in the 
supply of competing assets issued by foreign govern- 
ments and other entities, among other  factors. 
The net effect of these developments  on future 
financing of the U.S. current  account cannot be pre- 
dicted with precision. Nonetheless, we can attempt in 
this section to indicate how plausible future current 
account paths might be financed and to provide a qual- 
itative assessment of the financial pressures that may 
result.  We begin  with a conceptual  analysis of the 
effects of U.S. debt accumulation on interest rates and 
exchange  rates. We then apply this analysis in evaluat- 
ing illustrative  financing  scenarios  corresponding to 
alternative evolutions of the current account deficit over 
the next five years. 
Financial implications of the debt accumulation 
When the United States runs a current account defi- 
cit, it must borrow from abroad by giving  foreigners 
claims on  U.S. residents. Most assets issued by U.S. 
residents are denominated in dollars, so foreigners will 
typically accumulate dollar assets when financing  a 
U.S. current account deficit.18 
The response of financial markets to a U.S. current 
account deficit will therefore depend importantly on the 
willingness of foreigners to hold a larger share of dollar 
assets in their portfolios. Dollar assets are likely to be 
riskier for foreigners than assets denominated in their 
domestic currency if only because of the difficulty  of 
predicting exchange rate changes. Thus as foreigners' 
dollar holdings rise in relation  to their wealth, an 
adjustment in the financial markets is likely. This 
adjustment can take a combination of two forms. First, 
rates of return on U.S. assets might increase to com- 
pensate foreigners for the additional risk they face by 
holding dollar assets. That is, U.S.  real interest rates 
would  have to increase  relative  to interest  rates  in 
other countries in order for additional dollar holdings to 
become attractive.  Second,  exchange  rates could 
adjust to restore equilibrium in asset markets by reduc- 
ing the value of dollar assets in foreign portfolios. This 
dollar depreciation would effectively oftset the rise in 
the dollar share of foreign portfolios that would other- 
wise occur. 
The financial adjustment accompanying the current 
account  deficit depends on the extent to which for- 
eigners are willing to substitute dollar assets for assets 
denominated in their home currency. Factors influenc- 
ing the substitutability of internationally traded assets 
include regulatory provisions toward cross-border 
financial transactions, differences in tax treatment, and 
differences in  risk. For most industrial countries,  the 
most important influence on the substitutability of for- 
eign and home assets is their relative risks, which are 
11The U.S. external deficit reflects both a decline in the private saving 
rate and a rise in government  borrowing.  Together, these 
developments  imply that foreigners must hold a greater share of 
outstanding dollar assets. 
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I- largely a reflection of two factors: the perceived vol- 
atility in their own returns  and  the extent to which 
foreign assets offset (diversify) fluctuations in domestic 
asset yields. Evidence on this point suggests that dol- 
lar assets and  foreign currency assets generally are 
good substitutes; that is, investors  require  relatively 
small additional return to change the shares of the two 
assets in their  portfolios.19 Thus,  a U.S.  current 
account deficit is likely to have a large effect on U.S. 
interest rates only if it substantially raises the share of 
dollar assets in foreign portfolios. 
While the recent U.S. current  account deficits are 
large in historical terms, they do not represent a very 
large share of private  industrial  country wealth.  For 
example,  the 1988  current account deficit of about $135 
billion represents roughly 1.3 percent of the wealth of 
the seven major industrial countries at the end of 1987 
(that is, the value of outstanding  government bonds 
and equities for the United States, Japan, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Italy). Thus, a 
U.S. current account deficit of this size would add a 
relatively small amount to the share of dollar assets in 
aggregate foreign portfolios during any particular year. 
The cumulative effects of a deficit sustained over sev- 
eral years would be greater and potentially more signif- 
icant, however. 
To provide an indication of the likely size of the inter- 
est rate adjustments accompanying current  account 
deficits, we use a mean-variance model of international 
asset demand.2°  This model of asset choice assumes 
that  investors choose their portfolios  to  balance 
required return and risk (as measured by the variance 
of returns). Assuming that international investors have 
a fixed trade-off between risk and expected return, the 
expected returns on a particular asset will be propor- 
tional  to the additional risk introduced into the average, 
or world, portfolio by holding  slightly more of that 
asset. Changes in portfolio  shares will generally alter 
the risk associated with each asset  in the portfolio and 
thus alter the required return on each asset. Our esti- 
mates suggest that small to moderate increases in the 
dollar share of aggregate portfolios add only modestly 
'°See Jeff  rey Frankel,  The Implications of Mean-Variance  Optimization 
for Four Questions in International  Macroeconomics,' Journal of 
International  Money  and Finance, March 1986; Jeff  rey Frankel  and 
Charles Engel,  "Do  Asset-Demand  Functions  Optimize  over the Mean 
and Variance of Real Returns? A Six-Currency  Test,"  Journal of 
International  Economics,  December 1984; and Benjamin  Friedman 
and Kenneth  Weiller,  "The Substitutability of  U.S. and Foreign 
Assets," Federal Reserve  Bank of New  York. Research  Paper 
no. 8714, in International  Integration of  Financial  Markets and  U.S. 
Monetary  Policy, December 1987. 
20See William Branson and Dale Henderson.  "The Specification  and 
Influence of Asset Markets," in Ronald  W. Jones and Peter B. Kenen, 
eds., The  Handbook of  International Economics,  vol. 2  (New York: 
North-Holland,  1985), for a detailed description of this model. 
to total risk; consequently only fairly small compensat- 
ing increases in yield are required. 
Table 4 reports estimates of the effect of a U.S. cur- 
rent account  deficit equal to 1  percent of industrial 
country wealth on the annualized real  return of one- 
month dollar-denominated assets measured relative to 
returns in selected countries. The U.S. external deficit 
is assumed to be matched by the combined surpluses 
of Japan and Germany.  The estimates are  based on 
return  volatilities  estimated from observed  (ex post) 
yields over the last several years.21 The table shows, 
for example,  that the deficit would raise U.S. real inter- 
est rates relative to German interest rates by 6.1 basis 
points. This estimate represents the direct impact of a 
single  year's external deficit only. If the deficit  is 
expected to persist, the effect on longer-term yields is 
likely to be greater, since short-term rates would be 
expected to rise in future years. 
These estimates may somewhat understate the effect 
of additional  dollar indebtedness to foreigners.  The 
estimates are based on the assumption that investors 
expect to experience risk in the future similar to that 
observed on average in the past. In practice, however, 
the return volatility and associated risks of financial 
assets can vary considerably over time horizons of 
several  years. It is not unusual, for example, to observe 
volatility varying by a factor of two or more over 
periods of several years.22 If this pattern were to per- 
21These estimates are described in Appendix B. They are obtained 
using the model presented  in Karen Lewis,  "Inflation Risk and Asset 
Market  Disturbances:  The Mean-Variance  Model Revisited," Journal of 
International  Money and Finance,  September 1988. 
See  Charles Engel and Anthony  Rodrigues,  "Tests  of International 
CAPM  with Time-Varying  Covariances,"  Journal of  Applied 
Econometrics,  1989 (forthcoming); and Alberto Giovannini  and 
Table 4 
Change in U.S. Return, Relative to Other 
Countries, Resulting from a U.S. Currrent 
Account Deficit Equal to 1 Percent  of World 
Wealth 
(Annual Rate in Basis Points) 
Change in One-Month  U.S.  Real  Interest 







tThe calculations assume current account surpluses in 
Germany  and Japan equal to one-third and two-thirds of the 
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lar assets, under some circumstances,  could  be as 
much as twice  that in Table 4. Such an outcome,  or  an 
even greater interest rate  effect, is at least a real pos- 
sibility if large external deficits persist and foreign dol- 
lar exposures  consequently grow well beyond those 
observed in the past. 
If domestic real interest rates do not adjust to the 
additional U.S.  debt arising from the current account 
deficit— a plausible development if monetary authori- 
ties were pursuing a policy of stable real interest rates 
—then dollar depreciation is likely to restore equilib- 
rium. This depreciation would  effectively  reduce the 
foreign  currency  value of dollar assets, leaving 
unchanged the dollar asset share in foreign  portfo- 
lios.23 The exchange  rate adjustment  in one  year 
depends on the shifts in the overall demand for assets 
associated with the current account deficit. For exam- 
ple, the combination of a U.S. deficit and a Japanese 
surplus shifts demand from dollar assets to yen assets. 
The change in demand induced by U.S. and Japanese 
current accounts of the size  that occurred  in  1988 
would lead to roughly 3 percent depreciation of the dol- 
lar against the yen.24 
Future financing scenarios 
While the precise financial impacts of future U.S. defi- 
cits are impossible to predict, the evidence we have 
reviewed above provides a basis for roughly assessing 
the consequences  of alternative plausible paths for the 
external deficit over the next several years. Of particu- 
lar interest is whether the financing of future U.S. defi- 
cits will be feasible without significant  increases  in 
domestic interest rates or dollar depreciation beyond 
those needed to offset the differential between U.S. 
and foreign inflation. We base our assessments in part 
on two hypothetical scenarios for the financing of the 
assumed deficit paths, using assumptions about var- 
ious components derived from past experience. These 
scenarios should be viewed as indications of the range 
of possible outcomes rather than precise forecasts. 
The main assumptions underlying the two scenarios 
are given in Table 5. The two paths for  the U.S. current 
account deficit  probably span the range of the most 
Footnote  22 continued 
Philippe Jorion, "The Time-Variation  of Risk and Return in the Foreign 
Exchange  and Stock Markets" Columbia University  Working  Paper, 
1987. These authors present evidence that conditional variances of 
monthly returns are occasionally at least twice the  value of  the 
unconditional  variances on which our calculations are based. 
To  the extent that dollar depreciation is anticipated, nominal  U.S. 
interest rates will rise relative to foreign returns. 
The  basis for  this calculation  is described in more detail in Appendix  B. 
Frankel, in "The Implications of  Mean-Variance  Optimization," has 
argued that expectational  effects could imply larger depreciation. 
likely outcomes: in the first, more pessimistic path, the 
deficit remains at 2'14 percent of GNP, roughly its pres- 
ent level, over the next five years. This scenario essen- 
tially  corresponds to little change in policy or other  fun- 
damental conditions underlying the external deficit.  In 
the second path,  the deficit falls steadily to 
1 percent of GNP by 1993. This path is most likely to 
accompany a substantial reduction in  the  U.S.  fiscal 
deficit and reasonable demand growth abroad.  Most 
other  plausible paths for the current account deficit fall 
between these two illustrative cases. 
Our assumptions for net direct  investment and official 
inflows are based on recent experience, as reviewed in 
the last section. We assume that the net direct invest- 
ment inflow increases by $2.3 billion per year from a 
1988 base of $21.8 billion. This growth is consistent 
with the trend of net inflows, excluding currency trans- 
lation effects, over the last several  years (see Appendix 
A). As explained earlier, these translation effects are 
unlikely to be as large as those observed recently. In 
order to concentrate on potential  strains associated 
with private financing,  we assume that official dollar 
asset holdings rise by 8 percent per year, a rate 
roughly consistent with average recent behavior  and 
foreign nominal GNP growth.25  While official interven- 
'According to figures reported by the International  Monetary  Fund, 
official dollar holdings as measured by dollar foreign exchange 
reserves  were about $320 billion at year-end  1987. Average  growth in 
Table 5 
Assumptions Underlying  the Financing 
Scenarios 
(In Billions of Dollars) 
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
39.1  27.7  29.9  32.3  34.8  37.6 
19.0  24.1  26.4  28.7  31.0  33.3 
Official inflowst 
Direct investment 
net  inflows 
Current account deficit 
Scenario I  135  125  135  146  157  170 
Scenario  II  135  125  100  80  65  55 
Memo: 
Foreign nominal GNP growth 
(foreign currency)  6 percent per year 
Dollar depreciation  2 percent per year 
Net wealth growth  8 percent per year 
Note: 1988 data are actual (preliminary) figures. 
fOfficial inflows  are assumed to include all net foreign official 
purchases of dollar-denominated  assets. 
*Net wealth is approximated by  government  debt plus stock 
market  capitalization for  the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Germany,  Japan, Canada, France. and Italy. Growth 
is in dollar terms. 
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sure, we argue below that the intervention would have 
to be extraordinarily  large to avoid  private financing 
strains entirely, at least under the high deficit scenario. 
The projected financing of the high current account 
scenario, given in Table 6, indicates that continuation 
of U.S. deficits at  their present level relative to GNP will 
lead to substantial growth ri external debt, both abso- 
lutely and  (more  importantly) relative to industrial 
country wealth. Under this more pessimistic scenario, 
total net debt increases at an annual rate of more than 
20 percent, while the position excluding official obliga- 
tions  (a very rough proxy for the dollar exposure of 
private investors) grows by  24 percent per year, 
roughly triple the assumed growth of foreign GNP mea- 
sured in dollars. As a share of wealth, the private net 
debt of the U.S.  doubles from about  2.6 percent of 
wealth in 1988 to 5.2 percent in 1993—a modest level 
Footnote  25 continued 
these holdings was about 5.3 percent per year over 1982-86, 
compared to about 10.8 percent for 1982-87.  Our projected growth 
over the next five years is  thus about midway between these averages. 
Table 6 
in absolute terms but a substantial proportionate rise. 
In contrast, in the second scenario with a steadily 
falling deficit, net debt grows much less rapidly, partic- 
ularly after  1990, and net private debt varies little after 
1990 relative to wealth (Table 7). The current account 
deficits  and the debt increases are close to those of 
the first scenario through 1990 but much lower in the 
subsequent years. 
Because of potential financial strains in the high defi- 
cit scenario, actual official financing could exceed the 
amounts assumed in  our calculations.  Central bank 
intervention would probably not be great enough, how- 
ever, to eliminate  the differences  between the sce- 
narios.26  In particular, official financing would have to 
average over $100 billion annually during the next five 
years to keep the share of dollar assets in wealth at its 
1988  estimated level (see the memorandum  in Table 6). 
This level of  official financing could probably be kept up 
for a year or two but, if sustained over the entire five- 
year horizon, would more than double the stock of for- 
lf,  for  example,  official inflows after 1988 were twice the  value shown 
in Table  5, private holdings of dollar-denominated  debt as a share of 
total wealth would be about one percentage point less at  the end of 
the horizon under the pessimistic current account scenario than our 
projections now imply, but would remain  higher than in scenario 2. 
Financing  Projections  — Scenario  I 
Average 
Annual Flow 
1989-90  1991 -93 
U.S. external  debt 
(billions of  dollars)  130  158  488  748  1221 
Annual growth 
(percent)  24  18 
Private capital inflows 
(billions of dollars)  101  123  299  502  870 
Securities and 
banking 
(billions of  dollars)  76  92  324  476 
External debt as a 
share of net  wealth 
(percent)  4.3  5.6  7.3 
Private external debt 
as a  share of net wealtht 
(percent)  2.6  3.8  5.2 
Memo: Required  official financing to maintain 1988 private net 
debt share of  wealth (billions of dollars per year) 
Note: The calculations are based on the assumptions  in 
Table  5. 
tDebt stocks are book value terms and are based on the 
end-1987  official estimates. 
tNet wealth is government  debt plus stock  market 
capitalization for  the United States,  United Kingdom. Germany. 
Japan, Canada, France, and Italy. 
Average 
Annual Flow  End-Year Stockt 
1989-90  1991-93  1988  1990  1993 
U.S. external  debt 
(billions of dollars)  113  67  488  713  913 
Annual growth 
(percent)  21  9 
Private capital inflows 
(billions of dollars)  84  32  299  467  562 
Securities and 
banking 
(billions of dollars)  58  1  324  441  443 
External debt as  a 
share of net wealth* 
(percent)  4.3  5.4  5.5 
Private  external debt 
as a share of  net  wealtht 
(percent)  2.6  3.5  3.4 
Note: The calculations are based on the assumptions  in 
Table  5. 
tDebt stocks are book value terms and are based on the 
end-1987  official estimates. 
tNet wealth is government  debt plus stock market 
capitalization for the United States, United Kingdom, Germany. 
Japan. Canada, France, and Italy. 
End-Year Stockt 
1988  1990  1993 
Table 7 




105  128 
91  37 
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money and credit growth, central banks would have to 
offset dollar purchases of this magnitude with large 
sales of domestic assets; consequently,  the banks 
might experience significant technical difficulties in car- 
rying out monetary policy.28 For these reasons, suffi- 
cient official financing to prevent a marked rise in the 
dollar exposure of private  foreign  lenders under the 
first scenario seems unlikely, unless strains in financial 
markets were to become very substantial. 
Financial implications 
Coupled with the analysis earlier in this section, our 
examination of the financing projections scenario 
strongly suggests that a sustained current account defi- 
cit near  current levels will lead to potentially significant 
financial pressures on domestic interest rates and the 
dollar. In contrast, such financial pressures are likely to 
be much smaller, particularly after 1990, in the declin- 
ing deficit scenario. The exact size of these pressures 
is hard to predict because it depends on a variety of 
influences affecting demand for U.S. dollar assets and 
on factors influencing the supply of U.S.  and foreign 
currency assets. However, the scenarios imply that the 
financial pressures will be lower if the deficit declines 
than if it does not. 
These impressions are confirmed by rough estimates 
of the scenarios' financial  implications  based on the 
framework discussed earlier in this section. Table 8 
shows the increase in U.S. real interest rates relative to 
rates abroad needed to ensure private financing for the 
projected current  account deficit path with no further 
real dollar depreciation (that is, assuming that all the 
financing  pressures fall on interest rates rather  than 
exchange rates). These estimates are measures of the 
effect of additional dollar exposure and do not include 
other influences on interest rates that could  arise. 
The analysis suggests that continued large external 
deficits would lead to moderate increases of about 26 
2flndeed, current official dollar reserves  may now be significantly 
above those desired under more normal circumstances because of 
the heavy interventions since 1985.  To a greater extent than over the 
last three years. future intervention is likely to arise from the actions 
of a few major industrial country central banks. The reason is that 
Taiwan. which accounted for nearly one-quarter of all official dollar 
purchases in 1986-87,  is unlikely to add significantly to its holdings 
over the next several  years. 
2lhree maior countries,  Japan. Germany,  and the United Kingdom, 
have typically accounted for  most of the dollar purchases by foreign 
industrial country central banks. In all three countries,  dollar 
purchases exceeded the total growth in bank reserves in 1987. 
Monetary policy operations to control bank reserve growlh are 
conducted most easily in domestic assets and only with more 
difficulty in foreign securities. While serious monetary control 
problems do not seem to have resulted from the heavy interventions 
of 1986-87.  they could develop if dollar  purchases were to  continue 
at that rate for several more years. 
to 33 basis points in U.S. short-term interest rates rela- 
tive to rates abroad. The estimated increase in longer- 
term rates is noticeably higher, about 37 to 46 basis 
points, because of expectations of increasing short- 
term rates as the debt continues to accumulate  in 
future years. In contrast, the declining deficit scenario 
would imply an increase in long-term interest rates rel- 
ative to foreign returns that was less than half as large, 
with much of the change early in the period. 
Table 9 shows the decline in the dollar that would be 
needed to induce private foreigners to supply the nec- 
essary deficit financing  without an  increase  in  real 
interest rates. (The required depreciation is essentially 
that required to prevent foreign dollar holdings from 
increasing in  relation to wealth). Higher relative U.S. 
real interest rates are likely to be avoidable under the 
pessimistic current account scenario only at  the cost of 
significant further dollar depreciation. Indeed, the dollar 
might fall by 25 percent further in the next few years 
under these circumstances. 
In practice, financing of a continued large U.S. deficit 
is likely to lead to a combination  of interest rate 
increases and dollar decline. Moreover, the absolute 
effects on U.S. interest  rates also depend upon the 
deficit's impact on foreign yields. The effects shown in 
Tables 8 and 9 appear fairly  moderate, but they may be 
somewhat misleading. An increase of 37 to 46 basis 
points in U.S. long-term real interest rates, for example, 
is not large in comparison with the rates' yearly fluctua- 
tion. A permanent increase of this magnitude, however, 
is more substantial in relation to the longer term aver- 
age of this rate (typically about 2 to 3 percent for gov- 
ernment bonds). Such  an  increase could have  a 
Table 8 
Increases in U.S. Real Interest Rates Relative 
to Japan and Germany 
(Basis  Points) 
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Short-Term  Rate 







Long-Term  Rate 
Scenario I  Scenario II 
13  11 
33  16 
10  9 
26  13 
26  15 
46  17 
21  12 
37  14 
Notes: The increases in U.S. real interest rates relative to 
specific foreign rates are measured  from end-1988  through the 
end of the given period. The scenarios are defined in Table 5. 
The short-term  rate refers to an annualized  one-month  holding 
period yield. The long-term rate is  the annualized  return on 
five-year bonds. noticeable impact on the domestic cost of capital and 
on investment  spending.  Furthermore,  the required 
increase in U.S. interest rates would be even greater if 
foreign real interest rates were to rise—a particularly 
likely outcome if the external deficit remains high. 
More important, these estimates of financial impacts 
are probably conservative,  especially if the current 
account deficit does not decline appreciably. As indi- 
cated earlier, investors may perceive the risk of holding 
dollar assets as substantially greater than that implied 
by past experience. It is conceivable, for example, that 
continued large U.S. exterhal deficits would seriously 
undermine market confidence in this country's policy 
credibility and  economic stability; in  that case,  the 
interest rates required to maintain foreign holdings of 
U.S. debt could be considerably higher than those 
shown in the table. 
These exercises can only suggest the possible pat- 
terns that the future financing of U.S. external deficits 
may follow. Because  future demand for U.S. dollar 
assets is likely to be affected by a number of factors 
not explicitly considered in our analysis, the potential 
outcomes in either  deficit scenario may vary greatly. 
Nevertheless, the analysis does strongly imply that 
continued external deficits at present levels could lead 
to increased financial pressures with economically sig- 
nificant implications. In this sense, continued high defi- 
cits may  pose clear financial  risks.  In contrast,  the 
analysis  suggests  that these  risks  might be largely 
avoided if the deficit declines steadily and substantially 
over the next several years. 
Conclusion 
For a number of years there have been warnings that 
continued rapid accumulation of U.S. external debt to 
finance large current account deficits will lead to 
serious financial strains. Yet the financing of the deficit 
has  proceeded more smoothly  than most observers 
thought possible when the deficits first emerged in the 
Table  9 
Cumulative  Dollar Depreciation  against the 
Yen Implied by the Scenarios 
(In Percent) 
Scenario I  Scenario II 
1990  11  9 
1993  26  13 
Notes: Depreciation is measured from end-1988  through the 
end of the given period and is an addition to  that assumed in 
Table  5. Financial pressures are assumed to  fall entirely on 
exchange rates with no change in real interest rates. 
early 1980s. This apparent contradiction between pre- 
diction and experience has raised questions about how 
serious the financial consequences of continued large 
deficits might be. Historical  precedents provide only 
very limited guidance  in answering  such questions 
because of the exceptional size of the U.S. deficit and 
the rapidly changing  world financial  environment  in 
which it is being financed. 
This article has attempted to identify key features of 
the financing of the U.S. current account deficit and to 
assess what past experience and other  evidence sug- 
gest about  the risks that may arise under plausible 
future deficit scenarios. We have seen that the experi- 
ence with funding the deficit since 1982 provides both 
positive  and negative signals about  future financing 
prospects. Among the positive indications is the fact 
that most of the $600 billion borrowed from abroad 
over 1983-88 has come from private sources. Official 
financing admittedly has become important during the 
last three years, although in part because of exchange 
rate policies; private financing, in any case, has again 
been the dominant financing source over the last year. 
Also  encouraging is the likelihood that direct  invest- 
ment will  provide  a significant amount of current 
account financing over the next several years. 
At the same time, however, there are signs that 
future conditions may be somewhat less favorable to 
U.S. borrowing from other countries. Purchases of U.S. 
securities, the largest single source of current account 
financing, have been greatly encouraged by the diver- 
sification of foreign investor portfolios in response to 
the growing  international  financial  integration  of the 
1980s. Major foreign financial institutions, particularly in 
Japan, now have significant exposures to U.S. dollar 
assets as a result of this process and they may be less 
willing to increase these exposures in the future. Addi- 
tional development of international financial  markets, 
as well as changes in the financial climate within major 
foreign industrial countries, may encourage investment 
in assets  competing with the dollar, and hence may 
lead to slower growth in the demand for U.S.  assets 
than in the past. 
Given the complexity of the factors  involved, any 
assessment of the effects of future financing of U.S. 
external deficits  is likely to be quite imprecise. Our 
analysis has been based on the assumption that the 
private foreign exposure to dollar assets arising from 
the U.S. external deficit will be a key determinant of the 
deficit's financial impacts. In principle, increases in pri- 
vate foreign net dollar holdings relative to wealth, or in 
the perceived risks of  dollar  assets, are likely to lead to 
financial changes,  including upward  pressures on 
domestic real interest rates and downward pressures 
on the dollar. Continued external deficits at present 
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ing growth in private foreign dollar exposures and may 
imply significant financial pressures in coming years. 
The estimated increase in long-term real interest rates 
under this scenario, slightly less than one-half of one 
percentage point by 1993, is sizable compared to his- 
torical averages, although not so large in relation to the 
average of the last several years. But this estimate, 
based largely on historical experience, is likely to prove 
conservative. Given the growing uncertainties  about 
the macroeconomic and financial environment that are 
likely to accompany continued high deficits, the pres- 
sures on interest rates and exchange rates could easily 
be considerably greater than those implied by the sim- 
ple model used for the text estimates, and their eco- 
nomic impacts could be significantly more adverse. 
On balance, therefore, the evidence  suggests that 
there is a basis for concern about the potential finan- 
cial consequences of continued large external deficits 
and rapid accumulation of indebtedness to foreigners. 
This, of course, does  not mean that major  financial 
strains are either  imminent or inevitable; nor can the 
possibility be ruled out that further changes in world 
financial conditions favoring demand for U.S. assets, or 
other factors, will  allow future U.S.  deficits to be 
financed without serious problems. Nonetheless,  there 
is  tangible  and concrete  evidence  that the risks of 
serious financial problems are  growing and will  con- 
tinue to rise in coming years if the external deficit is 




Appendix A: The Role of Direct investment 
This appendix examines  the role of direct investment in 
the financing of the  U.S. current account deficit and 
considers  how that  role  might  change as the adjustment 
process  proceeds.  Foreign direct investment  inflows 
into the United States have grown steadily throughout 
the decade, spurred on mainly by favorable U.S.  eco- 
nomic conditions. The outflow of U.S. direct investment 
abroad,  while exhibiting more volatile behavior,  has also 
expanded  over this period. Between 1985 and 1987, the 
inflows and outflows of  direct  investment basically can- 
celed each other out, leaving net direct  investment  with 
little to contribute to the financing of growing U.S. cur- 
rent account imbalances. (It has, however,  made a sub- 
stantial contribution in 1988.) Nevertheless,  our analysis 
suggests that many of the factors that recently affected 
direct investment inflows and outflows may be transi- 
tory, and that direct investment will provide significant 
net financing over the next several years. 
Overview 
In the balance of payments accounts, "direct invest- 
ment" refers to investments by foreigners in business 
enterprises in which the foreigners' control exceeds 10 
percent. Direct investment funds can enter the country 
in three different ways. First, a parent corporation can 
directly place  funds in a business outside  its home 
country's borders — establishing a new plant abroad, 
buying out an existing factory, purchasing real estate, 
participating in a joint venture with a foreign firm, or 
increasing its equity  holdings beyond the 10 percent 
threshold. Second, a foreign affiliate may decide not to 
repatriate its earnings to the parent corporation but to 
reinvest them in its own operations. Third, the foreign 
affiliate can raise funds in the Euromarket or other for- 
eign securities markets. 
The  motives for undertaking direct investments are 
generally more complex than those determining portfo- 
lio investments. While the composition of a securities' 
portfolio is typically  based primarily on the  expected 
yields and risks of its components, direct investments 
are influenced by a mix of corporate strategies, macro- 
economic conditions in different nations, and national 
policies toward foreign investment. 
Chart 2 of the text shows the pattern of net direct 
investment flows during the  1980s.  The chart reveals 
that earlier in the decade a surplus of direct  investment 
entered the United States; these funds significantly off- 
set concurrent imbalances in the U.S. current account. 
From 1985 to 1987, the current account deficit contin- 
ued to balloon, but direct investment  flows fell into bal- 
ance, providing little net capital inflow to offset  our net 
current outflows. This pattern changed again in 1988 as 
direct investment outflows fell and net inflows rose to 
over $20 billion. 
Foreign  direct investment  In the United States 
The low level of  net direct investment  over 1985-87  can- 
not be attributed to  any diminution  of  foreign willingness 
to invest in U.S. businesses. Indeed, flows of foreign 
direct investment have grown steadily  throughout the 
decade, building to  a high of $42 billion in 1988. Most of 
these funds are "new" investments made by foreign 
corporations, which means that foreigners are concen- 
trating on buying out existing U.S. firms or establishing 
U.S. affiliates. 
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Much of this growth can be attributed to favorable 
economic  conditions  in the  United States.  Moderate 
growth in economic activity and low inflation, combined 
with the depth of  the domestic market, make the United 
States an attractive location for foreign firms. In addi- 
tion to  the country's favorable economic  climate, factors 
that have recently strengthened foreign direct invest- 
ment include increased mergers and acquisitions activ- 
ity, foreigners' desire to diversify their investment port- 
folios, and the fall in the dollar's value since 1985. 
The current wave of U.S. corporate restructuring has 
created an unusual opportunity for foreigners to obtain 
U.S. businesses. By far the most active players in this 
international  mergers and acquisitions  activity have 
been  the British. A recent study by the British-American 
Deal Review  estimates that the British committed $32.5 
billion to acquire  400 U.s. companies  in 1988; the Japa- 
nese are estimated to have bid roughly $12 billion last 
year. British investors, reaping large  corporate profits at 
home,  have moved aggressively during this period of 
restructuring,  particularly in the areas of  manufacturing, 
retail trade, and financial services.  These purchases 
have secured the  British position as the largest direct 
investor in the United States. The Japanese, however, 
have been reluctant to engage in hostile takeovers of 
U.S. corporations, although  their  direct  investment  posi- 
tion in the United States has increased. The Japanese 
share of total direct  investment  in this  country rose from 
8 percent to 13 percent during the 1982-87 period, mak- 
ing Japan  the third largest direct investor after the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
Much of the growth in Japanese direct  investment  can 
be explained by the  desire of Japanese institutional 
investors to diversify their portfolio of U.S. assets. Well- 
publicized real estate purchases  by Japanese life insur- 
ance companies and other financial entities have 
increased Japanese direct investment in the United 
States without necessarily augmenting productive 
capacity here. The placement of these  funds, however, 
does provide the Japanese investor with a stream of 
returns in the form of rents and, in this sense, repre- 
sents an alternative to bond or other securities invest- 
ments. Moreover,  income from real estate and other 
similar ventures, at least over the  long run, is apt to 
provide a  better hedge against inflation than fixed (nom- 
inal) income instruments. 
Dollar depreciation since 1985 has also supported the 
growth of  foreign direct investment in the United States. 
Though  the purchase price of U.S. assets falls with the 
drop in the dollar,  the foreign currency value of income 
from these investments falls as well. A recent paper by 
Richard Caves, however, finds that net foreign direct 
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investment responds positively to dollar  depreciation.t 
The boost given to direct  investment  inflows by these 
three factors  — increased  mergers  and  acquisitions 
activity, foreign portfolio diversification, and dollar 
depreciation — may be viewed as a break from the 
growth path determined by long-term corporate plan- 
ning. What we may be observing is a  stock-adjustment 
process in which foreigners are building up their stocks 
of U.S. corporate assets to some desired level dictated 
in part by the  global strategies  of different  multina- 
tionals (strategies such as developing niches in foreign 
markets,  diversifying raw materials sources, or capitaliz- 
ing on lower wage rates abroad). To the extent that the 
acceleration in direct investment inflows since 1986 is 
the result of foreigners seizing the opportunity to close 
the  gap between their actual and desired stocks, we 
can expect the inflows to slow from their present growth 
at some point in the future. 
U.S. direct Investment  abroad 
In contrast to the steady growth of foreign direct  invest- 
ment through the 1980s, flows of U.S. direct  investment 
abroad have been quite erratic, exhibiting little trend 
growth.  Direct investment outflows were near zero in 
1982, jumped to  over $44 billion in 1987, and then fell to 
$20 billion in 1985.  In this decade, almost all of the 
growth in U.S. direct  investment  abroad has come from 
the reinvested earnings of U.S. foreign  affiliates.  In 
1987,  72 percent of direct investment outflows came 
from reinvested earnings, and between 1981 and 1985 
the flow of reinvested earnings actually exceeded the 
total outflow of direct  investment  funds  4 Equity capital, 
or "new" direct investment, which constituted the bulk 
of the increase in foreign direct investment into  the 
United States, contributed little to the outflow of direct 
investment  (only 9 percent in 1987). 
The fluctuations in direct investment  outflows do not 
necessarily reflect changes in the desire of U.S. multi- 
nationals to invest or  expand  their  operations abroad. In 
fact, much of the volatility in direct  investment outflows 
is due to two accounting peculiarities that have a sub- 
tSee Richard E. Caves,  Exchange Rate Movements  and 
Foreign Direct Investment  in the U.S.," Harvard Instilute of 
Economic Research,  Discussion  Paper no. 1387, May 1988. 
*This is possible if the  sum of the two other types of direct 
investment  flows, equity capital and intercompany  debt, is 
negative.  The continued strong contribution of reinvested 
earnings to  total outflows from  the United States contrasts with 
direct investment  financing in other industrial nations. For 
example,  reinvested earnings represented  only 1 percent of 
German  direct investment  outf  lows between 1980 and 1983. 
See 'International Investment  and Multinational  Enterprises,' 
OECD, 1987. Appendix A: The Role of Direct Investment  (continued) 
stantial impact on the data. First, the Commerce 
Department  treats changes in asset values arising from 
exchange rate changes as income accruing to the for- 
eign affiliate in the current account. This bookkeeping 
profit is then recorded as an offsetting capital outflow 
(to the extent it is not repatriated).  These items can be 
quite large when the value of  the dollar  changes signifi- 
cantly. For example, in 1987 capital gains from dollar 
depreciation added over $15  billion to reported  direct 
investment outflows, more than  one-third of the total. 
Removing these capital gains and losses  (which are 
generally ignored in the balance of payments accounts 
of other industrial countries) provides a more accurate 
picture of  the true underlying trend in direct investment 
outflows.lI 
The second adjustment to the direct investment out- 
flow data arises from transactions between U.S. parent 
companies and their affiliates  in the Netherlands 
Antilles. Before 1984 it was advantageous  for U.S. cor- 
porations to raise new capital  by issuing Eurobonds 
through their Netherlands  Antilles affiliates and then to 
borrow these funds from their offshore subsidiaries. In 
the direct investment outflow data, these transactions 
appear as negative capital outflows. The Tax  Reform 
Act of 1984 repealed the 30 percent withholding tax on 
interest paid  to all foreigners,  not just to tax havens like 
the Netherlands  Antilles, making this convoluted financ- 
ing path unnecessary.  As a result, the main flow of  cap- 
ital between the countries is  now from the United States 
to the Netherlands  Antilles as  the U.S. corporations pay 
off  the old Eurobonds.  Capital outflows with Netherlands 
Antilles affiliates became positive in 1985 and totaled 
$2.5 billion in 1987. The removal of these transactions 
will increase direct  investment  outflows before 1985 and 
lower them in subsequent years. 
Adjusting for these two distortions of  the outflow data 
involves subtracting both capital gains due to transla- 
tion  adjustment and outflows to Netherlands Antilles 
affiliates. The reported and adjusted data are shown in 
Chart 1A. With these adjustments,  flows of  direct  invest- 
ment abroad are much less volatile than they  appear in 
§See Robert N. McCauley,  "Prospects for U.S. Debt Service 
Obligations," study prepared for the Joint Economic 
Committee,  1989 (forthcoming). 
IlTranslation  adjustments resulting from exchange rate 
movements  should be assessed at the  end of  the year along 
with the other valuation adjustments.  Therefore,  these 
corrections to the flow data will not affect the  direct 
investment  position series reported by the Commerce 
Department. 
the Commerce  Department  data and considerably 
below reported outflows for 1985-87. 
Future prespects 
As Chart 2 of the text reveals, net  direct investment 
inflows, excluding the two adjustments just discussed, 
have been significantly positive in recent  years. Our 
analysis suggests that while direct investment inflows 
should grow more slowly than in recent years, they are 
likely to exceed outflows. Assuming that the  dollar is 
fairly  stable, net direct  investment  should make a  signif- 
icant contribution to current account  financing in the 
coming years.# 
David G. Fernandez 
#Box-Jenkins models of  direct  investment  inflows and adjusted 
outflows imply that both components, as well as net direct 
investment,  tend to increase over time. The lext estimates  of 
future net direct investment  are based on a regression of net 
adjusted inflows on a time trend; this regression implies an 
increase of net direct  investment of about $2.3  billion per year. 
Chart IA 
Reported and Adjusted Direct  Investment 
Outflows 
*Adjusted direct investment outflows exclude capital gains 
and selected transactions with Netherlands  Antilles 
affiliates.  FIgure for 1988 is authors' estimate. 
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Billions  of  dollars 
Source:  Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Appendix B: Computing  Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Effects 
Our  estimates of interest rate and  exchange rate effects 
are derived from the single-period mean-variance 
model of asset choice, which assumes that investors 
choose their portfolios by balancing  expected return 
against variance of return.  Specifically, investors will 
continue to add a risky asset to their portfolios until the 
marginal return from the asset is equal to the marginal 
variance, weighted by the investors' desired trade-off 
between return  and variance.  Assuming a one-month 
time horizon for investors, the major sources of uncer- 
tainty are unexpected changes in exchange rates and 
unexpected inflation. Lewis has shown that asset 
demand under these  conditions will depend on both the 
expected return and risk of assets as shown below:t 
x = [A Var(a)J-l  [r — fus — Ea] 
— [Var(a)]-1 Cov(a,p) w. 
In the expression above, demand for foreign currency 
assets is given by the desired shares of each asset in 
the portfolio, x, and may be expressed as  the sum of  a 
speculative portfolio, [R Var(a)J-1  [r  —  — Ea], and a 
minimum variance portfolio,  — [Var(a)]-1  Cov(a,p)  w. 
The speculative portfolio suggests holding each asset 
at a share that sets its contribution to expected return 
equal to R times its contribution to variance. R, the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, gives  the additional 
expected  return investors require for each additional 
unit of risk, which is measured here by the variance of 
unexpected  dollar appreciation,  Var(a).  Speculative 
demand rises with the expected returns on the assets, 
relative to the return on dollar assets,  which equals 
[r —  — Ea] where Ea represents  the expected rate 
of dollar appreciation relative to other currencies. 
The minimum variance portfolio gives asset demand 
when investors are completely risk averse,  that is, when 
R = .  Even an extremely risk averse investor might 
hold an asset denominated in a foreign currency with 
the same expected return as a domestic asset if unex- 
pected dollar  appreciation against the currency, a, were 
negatively correlated with unexpected changes in the 
investor's inflation rate, p. This strategy creates a 
hedge against  domestic inflation.  World demand for 
assets will depend on the  distribution of wealth over 
countries, w, with greater weight placed on the demand 
of investors in wealthier countries. A current account 
deficit leads to a change in world  demand as wealth 
shifts  from the deficit country to surplus countries. 
Our estimates of the key parameters in the model— 
the variance of unexpected exchange rate appreciation 
and the covariances between forecast errors  in 
exchange rates and in inflation—are  derived using data 
from November 1977 through October 1988 for Japan, 
fLewis, 'Inflation Risk." 
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Germany,  Canada, France, Italy, the  United Kingdom, 
and the United States. The forecast error variances 
from a vector autoregressive model of spot exchange 
rates and inflation  rates,  measured by country con- 
sumer price indexes, are used to estimate Var(a) and 
Cov(a,p). 
The literature has provided a wide range of estimates 
for the coefficient of relative risk aversion  4 Lewis esti- 
mated our model over a similar time  period and 
obtained a coefficient around six. Her measure was 
used throughout this analysis. 
Country net government debt and wealth stocks are 
measured following a procedure proposed by Frankel. 
We add the debt measures to stock market capitaliza- 
tion, obtained from published figures in Morgan Stanley 
Capital International Perspective, to  obtain 1987 figures 
for country wealth and assets denominated by currency. 
The asset markets, interacting with product and factor 
markets, will determine the exchange rate and interest 
rate changes associated with a current account deficit. 
Two views of asset market adjustment are used here to 
bound the likely  exchange rate and interest rate 
changes.  The first emphasizes interest rate adjustment, 
which is most likely when authorities follow policies of 
fixed exchange rates. In this case, relative returns will 
change to equate asset demand and supply after a  shift 
in demand induced by a current account deficit. The 
second emphasizes  exchange rate adjustment, which is 
most likely when monetary authorities fix interest rates. 
As world demand for assets shifts with a current 
account deficit, exchange rate movements  could restore 
equilibrium through appreciation of currencies whose 
assets are in excess demand and through depreciation 
of currencies in excess supply. 
The mean-variance  model typically implies small 
annual interest  rate  responses and somewhat larger 
exchange rate responses to a current account deficit. 
Since current account deficits are typically a small 
share of wealth, they imply  small shifts of wealth from 
deficit to surplus countries and relatively small shifts in 
world demand for assets. Most evidence suggests that 
assets denominated in different currencies are reasona- 
bly good substitutes so that small changes  in the 
demand for assets will be accompanied  by modest 
changes in relative returns. 
To illustrate these points, consider a  model of  demand 
for assets denominated in yen and U.S. dollars: 
= [R Var(a)J-1  [uP —  — Ea] — 
[Var(a)]-1 [Cov(a,plP)  wiP  + Cov(a,pu8)  wu9. 
fEstimates range from two, in Frankel, "In Search of  the 
Exchange Risk Premium," to  fifty, in Giovannini  and Jorian, 
"The Time-Variation  of Risk and Return." 
§See Frankel,  "In Search of  the Exchange  Risk Premium." Appendix B: Computing  Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Eftects (continued) 
Here xlP is the  share of Japanese yen assets in the 
world portfolio, R is the coefficient of  relative risk aver- 
sion, a is the rate of appreciation of the dollar  against 
the yen, uP and i'  are one-month rates on yen-  and 
dollar-denominated  assets respectively,  pIP and pus are 
Japanese and American inflation rates, and wIP and w' 
are the shares of Japanese and American wealth in 
world wealth. We used a value of 6 for R and obtained 
the following variances  and covariances  using  data 
from November 1977 through October 1988: 
Var(a) = .001229,  Cov(a,plP) = —.001235, 
and Cov(a,pue)  = —  .00000073.11 
According to these estimates, demand for yen assets 
grows as Japanese wealth or U.S. wealth increases: 
XIP = (6 x .0012291 (riP —  — Ea 
— (.001229)-'  (—.001235  WP —.00000073  W") or 
xIP = 135.6 [tIP — tile — Eaj ÷ 1.005  wip 
+ .000594 w. 
The size of the coefficient on the expected  return 
implies that investors view yen and dollar assets as 
good substitutes, since small changes in relative 
returns generate large  shifts in the share of yen assets. 
Inverting the equation, we can express expected 
returns  on dollar assets relative  to yen  assets as a 
function of  the yen asset share as  well as  Japanese and 
U.S. wealth shares: 
[ti-" — liP + EaJ 
—  .007374 xIP ÷ .00741 P  + .00000438 W5. 
A U.S. current account deficit of $135 billion (the size 
of the deficit in 1988), would imply a decline of 1.3 per- 
cent in the U.S. share of  industrial country wealth, mea- 
sured at the end of 1987.# If the Japanese current 
account surplus were two-thirds of  the size of the U.S. 
deficit, somewhat above the 1988 level, the Japanese 
wealth share would increase by 0.9 percent. Our equa- 
tion for expected return implies that  the annualized U.S. 
return would increase relative to Japanese returns by 
liThese estimates are in decimal form and imply a standard 
error in forecasting monthly dollar  appreciation of  about three 
and a half  percentage points (=  100 V.001229). The similarity 
between the variance of unexpected dollar appreciation and 
the covariance between unexpected appreciation and 
Japanese  unexpected inflation results largely from  measuring 
Japanese  inflation in terms of the  dollar, which is the 
numeraire  currency for  aggregation.  This method is based on 
Lewis, "Inflation Risk." 
#Industrial country wealth is defined as government  debt plus 
stock market capitalization in Japan, Germany, Canada, 
France, Italy, the United States, and the United Kingdom. 
about 12 x .00067 = .008, or about 8 basis points at 
an annual rate. The magnitude of this estimate is con- 
sistent with others in the literature. 
The  exchange rate  change  required  to equilibrate 
asset markets, assuming no change in relative returns, 
is derived using the fact that the share of yen assets in 
total wealth xIP is the ratio of the dollar value of yen- 
denominated assets divided by the dollar  value of world 
assets, or: 
xiP = AJPeI(Afow + AJPe), 
where AJP is the stock of yen-denominated  assets, e is 
the exchange rate measured in dollars per yen, and 
A°" is the dollar value of assets not denominated in 
yen. A U.S. current account deficit, accompanied by a 
substantial Japanese current  account surplus, shifts 
wealth from the United States to Japan and, according 
to the demand equation, induces an increase in the 
world  demand for yen assets. Dollar depreciation will 
raise the dollar value of yen assets, equating demand 
and supply.* Each percentage point depreciation of the 
dollar  raises the dollar  value of yen assets by xiP (1-xiP) 
percent  so  the required dollar depreciation is  [XIP (1-XIP) J-1 
times the change in demand for yen assets, If the pre- 
vious example of a $135 billion U.S. current account 
deficit is used, the Japanese wealth share increases by 
0.9 percent, generating greater demand for yen assets 
of approximately  nine-tenths of one percentage point. A 
dollar  depreciation of [.39(1.39)J-10.9  3.8 percent is 
required to match the increased demand for yen assets 
induced by the U.S current account deficit.tt  This esti- 
mate is  comparable to others reported in the 
literature.U 
The calculations  of interest rate or exchange rate 
effects  for the financing scenarios  are similar to the 
examples  above except that a specific pattern of  future 
current account surpluses in Germany (one-third of  the 
U.S. deficit) and Japan (two-thirds of the U.S. deficit) is 
assumed,  the seven  country version of the asset 
demand model is used to compute  interest rate and 
exchange rate effects, and 1987 asset shares are used 
throughout the projection period. 
'This approach follows Frankel,  "The Implications  ot Mean 
Variance  Optimization." 
ttlhis  is based on the  estimate that Japanese  outside assets 
and stock market capitalization were about 39 percent of the 
total dollar value for the United Slates, Japan, Germany,  the 
United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Italy.  if  In "The Implications of Mean-Variance  Optimization," Frankel 
argues that larger estimates will be obtained if  present deficits 
lead to an expectation of  greater future deficits. In that case, 
present asset demand reflects both the  wealth shift arising 
from the  current account deficit and the  expectation of  future 
exchange rate depreciation. Greater exchange rate adjustment 
will be required to equate asset supplies and demands. 
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